.Sattar's funeral (AFP/Getty Images)..

How much of a setback, then, is the murder? Abdul Sattar was the dashing, robed thirtysomething figure America could use as an example of what Sunnis can get if they turn against terrorists. His tribesmen were formed into security forces and paid salaries. He grew in stature to the point that he was allowed to meet George W. Bush when the president made his Labor Day visit to Anbar. The sheik died Thursday when, a U.S. military official told NEWSWEEK, a car parked near the entrance to the sheik’s large compound exploded as he passed by. His death could throw the movement into disarray.

That’s the story line, anyway. But nothing in Iraq, especially tribal politics, is that simple. Abdul Sattar was the leader of only one of several factions lining up with the U.S. military, and his influence was always questionable. He was a useful role model, but the other tribal leaders had made their own decisions to oppose Al Qaeda and its violent atrocities. They and their constituent tribe members saw two foreign forces on their turf, the United States and Al Qaeda. When Al Qaeda became too ruthless in its killings of tribe members who failed to support them and too brutal in its enforcement of fundamentalist Islam, the tribes sought the help of the other big force, the Americans. Abdul Sattar was one of the first to emerge and won the biggest public accolades. But Abdul Sattar, who even allies suspected of being a smuggler and opportunist in the great tradition of desert tribesmen, was hardly standing alone.

Abdul Sattar’s death could lead to jockeying and bloodshed among the tribes--but that might have happened anyway. It’s even plausible that he was killed with the help of competitors within his own movement. The death just highlights the tensions and dangers that already existed for a tribal alliance rife with divisions and shifting coalitions, based on a mixture of power, security and money.