Vince,

Thanks much for your detailed response.  It helps clear the air for those interested in the fine details.  As a US Army veteran married to an African of some political stature, I know at least as well as you (maybe better) some of the hot potatoes your command delicately handles everyday.  I think as time goes on and the command continues to prove itself in word and deed it will become easier.  I recall Gen Ward stating that we can't change the past and he is right.  One really cannot blame average Africans for being wary with the history of colonialism on the continent. And the old cliche, "One Awww Sh*t equals 500 Atta boys!" holds especially true.  I can say this: Africans perceive AFRICOM's motive as benevolent in word but deep down they think there are ulterior motives for the US military to be there beyond peace and security.  I might tend to agree with them, conventional wisdom or not.    

Roger,

The article you cited is from May 3, 2007, not October. The dates are very important here. By October, the command was much better defined, General Ward had been confirmed by the U.S. Senate and was beginning his yearlong task of building the headquarters. Thus, the article you cited did not predate the "troubled rollout." It was published right in the middle of the rollout. AFRICOM at that time was a transition team numbering a few dozen people, nearly all of them midlevel staff officers in Stuttgart immersed in various studies, while more senior U.S. government representatives were in the midst of consultation with African nations, the international community and the various U.S. government agencies. In May 2007, Africa Command was something more than a study group and much, much less than a military headquarters. It was a Transition Team, with an emphasis on Transition.

The timing of the consultation also is important. In the first half of 2007, a joint Department of State-Department of Defense team, along with a senior USAID official, made two important consultation trips to Africa – in April (South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Botswana, Kenya, and Ethiopia/the Africa Union) and June 2007 (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti,and Ethiopia).  Before these trips, the Defense Department reached out to African embassies in Washington, D.C., for consultation with African governments.  Four “Africa Roundtables” were hosted by the D.C.-based Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) -- covering the five major sub-regions of Africa (North, South, Central, East, and West) as recognized by the African Union and its African Standby Force structure.  African Embassies were invited to send representatives to these roundtables, and all Washington-based embassies sent representatives  

Reaction among African nations to the presentations and discussions ranged from very positive to very negative, with most governments being neutral to mildly positive.  Some countries expressed significant concerns about military bases, while others issued unsolicited invitations for the United States to establish a base. Most of the negative commentary was found in articles and Op/Eds in the newspapers in a small number of regionally influential countries. Much of this commentary reflected domestic political concerns, regional dynamics, and genuine misunderstandings. After a few articles set the tone, criticizing AFRICOM was a pretty low-risk way of asserting your pan-African credentials, not too different from the way some U.S. politicians will seek hometown support by criticizing the U.N. or European allies . If you go back and look at the press and opinion pieces of that time, much of it was focused on a misperception that AFRICOM represented a kind of U.S.-led collective security alliance by which nations would cede a certain amount of sovereignty in order to have closer military relations with the United States, with the end goal of basing for U.S. forces. Those perceptions were far from accurate, and once the command was better understood, the concerns largely went away. But, thanks to the sticking power of the internet, all those early articles are still out there.

It's clear that for several months, going back to the presidential guidance of Feb 6, 2007, there was strong interest in placing a portion of the headquarters in one or several African countries. The idea, publicly discussed, was to align the headquarters into five separate offices that reflected the five brigades of the African Union Standby Force. In total, these offices would have a fairly small number of people, measured in the dozens, with the great majority of the command's staff at a rear base somewhere outside of Africa. When I interviewed for my job in May 2007, it was with the understanding that after a few years in Germany, my family and I might move to an African capital. That, actually, is the reason I accepted the job. My wife and I had both visited Africa as journalists in the 1990s and wanted our young children to have the experience of living and going to school in an African nation as part of an international community devoted to long-term development and stability. The early enthusiasm for moving to Africa was to build personal relationships with those already working there, and we shared this enthusiasm. That idea has been postponed indefinitely. Instead of living there, I take my family on vacations to Africa.

Many people considered AFRICOM a fully formed fait accompli when it was announced. In fact, when announced, it was a series of ideas and plans. There's a timeless military adage that no plan survives first contact with reality. Following more than six months of consultation with African nations, culminating in General Ward's visit to the African Union on November 7, 2007, it was decided that the headquarters location was much less important than the work of the people in the command, and that the work itself, on a continental level ,was actually well suited for a Europe-based group of people. There were also the realities I discussed in my earlier posting, concerning transport and infrastructure for American office workers and their families. Ultimately, following in-depth consultation with Africans, it was decided that, by building the command in Stuttgart and not forcing ourselves into Africa on an artificial, U.S.-imposed timeline, we could let people see what Africa Command was and was not. Over time, there could be informed, unemotional discussions of the best long-term location for the headquarters.

I guess the bottom line of what I'm saying is: Avoid falling into the mental traps of conventional wisdom. The truth is a lot more complicated, and, I think, much more interesting.

Vince Crawley

U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs

Vince, in October of 2007 the Council on Foreign Relations quotes US Africa Command's 2nd in charge VADM Moeller emphasizing that the command WILL have its headquarters on the continent.  http://www.cfr.org/publication/13255/  This was before the admittedly troubled rollout phase during which US consultations with African nations were at best limited.  Your words implying that keeping the HQ in Stuttgart was a logical decision is simply not true.  It was a result of backlash and negative PR from within Africa.  The cart got in front for the horse.  US Africa Command has noble goals and is doing great things in Africa.  It is a shame that credibility has been such a difficult issue for the command to overcome.  Maybe honest acknowledgment of mistakes made would be a step in the right direction.  I wish you the best success in the future.  Credibility increases US troop safety!